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1 
I. THE. ORIGIN OF. COLLECTIVE LAND REFORM ENTERPRISES IN THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
1. The introdüction of collective farming in the land reform 
Collective farming is introduced in 1972 by the state in eonnection 
with the reactivation of the Dominican land reform. This happens on 
the moment that specific measures are taken directed at the rice-
sector. After worldwar II rice has become the main food of the domini-
can population (T) and the state, which with regard to rice aims at 
national selfsufficiency and low consumers prices, attempts to get 
more control over this erop through the land reform. 
In Maroh 1972, as part of a series of land reform measures, a law is 
enacted which orders the transfer to the land reform institute - al 
Instituto Agrario Dominicano, IAD - of all riceland in farms larger 
than 3~4 ha which are irrigated by systems constructed by the govern-
ment. Half a year later it is determined that production of rice on 
land thus aquired by the land reform institute will be organized on a 
collective base. Once this law'is revised in 1974 it is stipulated, 
that the collective model can be applied also in other land reform 
projects, that is to say in projects where land is captured under 
other provision and/or where other crops are cultivated. After 1978 
agrarian reform land is giv-en out exclusively in the collective form. 
'2. Reasons for the introdüction of collective farming 
The collective farms came into effect in eonnection with the accelera-
tion of the process of land reform which started in 1962. President 
Balagaer was re-elected in 1970, but the election results indicated 
that his popularity had diminished especially in the rural sector (2). 
In the period from 1966 economie policy was aimed at a process of 
import substitution industralization, of which the rural sector had 
derived little advantage. The Land Reform Laws of 1972 (3) therefore 
intended to give more attention to the rural sector in economie 
policy. 
The interest for agriculture, however, also had an economie back-
ground. In eonnection with the industrialization policy as from 1966 
wages and salaries are strictly controlled (4), a measure which 
requires a concomitant cheap food policy. As rice has become the main 
food, certainly of the urban population, the state tries to get a firm 
grip on production and trade of this product. The policy is directed 
at in- creasing production and national selfsufficiency (5). But as 
rice is a first necessary it aims as well for a considerable degree of 
control over production and trade. 
Rice trade proceeds through the state, the mainly private rice milis 
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3 
pared to put more resources in credit and extension, at the disposal 
of the collective sector. 
Through the credit the state also got hold of the sales of the rice 
production, according with the policy aimed at controlling rice trade. 
Other reasons, often mentioned as raotive for the introduction of 
collective farming, such as preventing another unequal development 
among land reform farmers, or the possibilities for creating a social 
security system for members, have officially not been indicated in the 
dominican land reform. 
Theoretically the question of the existence of economies of scale also 
is an important issue in collectivization. From the economie point of 
view, preserving existing economies of scale or creating new ones is 
the strongest argument for collective production. On the other side 
collective produetion which is brought about on economie grounds will 
only be feasible if these advantages exceed the disadvantages which 
present themselves especially in the administrative and social area. 
Economies of scale in general result from productivity increases 
because technical changes become feasible, for example mechanization; 
from a diminishing cost per unit of output, for example as investments 
and overhead costs are divided over an increasing production; and from 
a stronger position to negotiate with external relations. 
The question is if preserving the scale of the exp'ropriated rice farms 
(or parts of them) indeed has yielded economies of scale in comparison 
with the alternative in which individual rice farms were created of 3 
to 4 has each. Further, if the collective rice farms have been eapable 
to indeed realize the eventual economies of scale and to prevent loss 
of efficiency as a consequence of land reform measures in the sense of 
transfer to and production by small farmers. 
As will be shown in par. III. 1 it is plausible that there are econo-
mies of scale in large scale rice growing in the Dominican Republic. 
In this study this will be investigated comparing individual and col-
lective land reform farms. The comparison with private enterprises 
must be omitted here. 
Differences in scale between collective and individual land reform 
farms hardly express themselves in differences in the -technique or 
technology used. In both cases there is irrigated cultivation and 
mechanization of land preparation and harvest. Also modern rice varie-
ties are used in both types of farms. Technique and technology are 
more defined by the objective of cultivating more than one erop a year 
than by the scale of the enterprises. The estimate is that in 1980 on 
the averatge 1.7 to 1.8 rice crops were harvested. On the larger farms 
eventually somewhat heavier machines are used 'and small airplanes for. 
spraying of chemicals. But in general, irrigation and mechanization, 
4 
whieh are required to get more than one harvest a year, are suffi-
ciently dividable as to result profitable as well on smaller farms. 
But irrigation and machinery are used more effectively on larger 
farms. There are therefor economies of scale whi.le the two types of 
farms use practically the same technique and technology. In the case 
of machinery this refers to a more efficiënt employment made possible 
by the fact that the machinery are held under own management and are 
available at any moment required. Irrigation in an irrigation-system 
asks for a high degree of coordination, which is more difficult to 
realize when a large number of farmers is involved. 
Management itself also has economies of scale, especially in external 
relations concerning financing, extension, buying and selling, irriga-
tion and machinery contracting. Scale not only can yield a substantial 
saving of time, but also the position for negotiations with external 
relations can be stronger. 
Of course collective farming also has disadvantages (see par. 1.3), 
but in general it can be said, that in the case of the dominican rice 
farms the condition that collective farming should present certain 
economies of scale, seems to be fulfiïled. 
3. The development of the collective land reform sector 
In the period 1962-1981 land was distributed by IAD to 46.200 farmers, 
a number which represent 12 percent of the total number of producers 
registrated in the Agricultural Census of 1981. In that year these 
land reform farmers disposed of 227.300 hectares on 8.5 percent of the 
total agricultural land. Table 1 gives for the period concerned the 
course and the extent of the establishment of individual and collec-
tive farms in the land reform. In 1981 30 percent of the land reform 
farmers worked under the collective model, involving nearly a quarter 
Table 1. Dom.Rep.Land reform 1962-1981 individual and collective farms; 
number and area (average per farmer) 
number area 
period indiv. collect. total individual collective total 
1962-1972 20.986 - 20.986 115.103 (5-5) - 115.103 
1973-1978, '11.298 6.729 18.027 56.866 (5-0) 24.096 (3-6) 80.962 
1979-1981 - 7.192 7.192 - 31.256 (4-4) 31.256 
32.284 13.921 46.205 171.969 (5-3) 55.352 (4-0) 227.321 
Source: IAD Boletin Informativo Annual, various years 
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II. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE OOLLECTIVE FARMS IN THE STUDY 
1 The fieldwork on the oollective enterprises 
In the first semester of 1981 a number of oollective farms have been 
investigated. This study included in particular the organization of 
the oollective enterprises and a comparison of the employment of labor 
on oollective and individual land reform farms. The study covered five 
oollective rice-farms, all of which were established in the period 
1973- 1976. Table 2 gives some general information concerning these 
farms, which are considered to be quite comparable, although, as al-
ways in the case of agricultural enterprises, there are small differ-
ences in soil quality, micro climate and position (10). 
In Chapter III the oollective farms in the study are compared on spe-
cific points with individual land reform farms cultivating rice. In 
this case this refers to farmers in land reform projects which were 
established before 1972, are situated in the direct neighbourhood of 
the oollective farms and are comparable with those farms. In the lower 
part of Table 2 there is some information on these individual farmers. 
Table 2. Dom.Rep. General information on the ricefarms in the study (1985) 
aoll&ctvjt fiaAmA 
Name of the farm Position Started Members Area (ha) Area per farmer 
RAMIA.A Esperanza 1973 35 105 3 - 00 
RAMIA.B Esperanza 1973 35 105 3-00 
JICOME Esperanza 1976 20 55 2-75 
EL P0Z0 Esperanza 1973 13 40 3-08 
VASQUEZ QUINTERO Rincon 1973 63 200 3-17 
LndUvi.da.aL ^ahmi, 
Project RINCON Rincon 1963 20 (83) 335 4-00 
Project BERMUDEZ Maizal 71 
MAURAN Maizal 7 (149) 402 2-70 
EL PRO- Maizal el 
'GRESO 
( ) Total of individual farmers in land reform project 
Source: fieldwork 
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2. A short history of the collective farms in the study 
The two collective rice farms Ramia A and B started in 1973 as one 
collective enterprise with 70 members on 210 hectares of land, which 
the government had bought from the big landowner Ramia. IAD organized 
in connection with the selection of the farmers a registration of 
candidates, in which could participate landless agricultural workers, 
who were head of families and with experience in rice growing. From 
about 200 applicants 64 members were selected, the other 6 entered 
through patronage. On the ground that they experienced a lot of labor 
problems in the collective model, the farmers repeatedly turned to IAD 
with the request to be allowed to divide the enterprise. In 1976 the 
farmers managed to get approval from the President of the Republic for 
a subdivision in two collective farms, each with 35 members and 105 
ha. 
Ramia B experimented in 1979 and 1981 with a further subdivision óf 
the farm based on three identifyable parcels, which were worked 
separately by three groups of respectively 4, 11 and 20 members. The 
net income of the farm was in these trials still equally distributed 
among all the members. In Ramia A the farmers have tried to 
individualize the work. On this farm labor dicipline always has been 
weak. 
Jicomé was transformed by the state into a collective farm in 1976, it 
'has 20 members and 55 hectares of riceland. In 1981 the farmers have, 
because of problems about the presence of the members on the work, 
individualized certain tasks. 
El Pozo dates from 1973, has 13 members and nearly 40 hectares of 
land. The farmers on this enterprise never have had big problems with 
the collective farm. The former owner is a big landowner and rice-
miller, who has been designated by the President of the Republic as 
his representative in he board of the 4 collective farms in Esperanza. 
Vasquez Quintero is the largest of 5 collective farms in the study. In 
1973 the state bought, under pression from the farmers who had oecupi-
ed the farm, 200 hectares from the heirs of José Vasquez Quintero. 
From about 300 candidates, originating from three surrounding villages 
IAD has selected 63 members. In 1978 the farmers themselves have sub-
divided the farm in three more or less equal parcels. The responsibi-
lity for the production on each pareel was, according to this arrange-
ment, with three groups of 21 members each, groups that were composed 
on the base of the three villages where the farmers came from. 
At the same time, however, within these groups a further subdivision 
was made. Every member was given the responsibility for performing all 
the manual work in a clearly defined pareel of the common land and for 
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the activities related with the adjoining irrigation channels and 
roads. The net returns were for the time being distributed equally 
among the members, but the intention was clearly to go as far as 
iadividualizing production costs and returns. In 1983 the enterprise 
set up a shadow bookkeeping, in which costs and returns of individual 
farmers and parcels were registrated. this distribution of income re-
flects, in the opinion of the farmers, the effort of each individual 
member, an arrangement which they had defended many years. The problem 
of the labor discipline was considered as one of the most important 
difficulties of the collective model. 
The farmers of Vasquez Quintero were not the only ones who tried out 
and introduced adjustments in the collective model. Through a coordi-
nating organization of 23 collective farms (627 members) in the region 
of Rincon-La Vega, the 'Asociación Padre Cabero', the farmers put 
pression on IAD for many years. Originally with the objective to get 
permission for the introduction of changes, later to obtain formal 
assent for the adjustment they de facto already introduced. In 1985 
the state formally approved the introduction of the so-called 
'associative model'. 
3. The administrative structure of the collective and associative 
farms 
The administrative organization of the collective farms (11) 
'presents on one side the usual structure of a cooperative: the General 
Assembly (GA) of the members as the superior organism, the Executive 
Committee (EC) in charge of the daily functioning of the organization. 
The EC is assisted in this task and specifically on a number of areas 
by committees formed from the members. At the other side in the case 
of the dominican model of the collective land reform farms the 
influence of the state is so dominant, that the self-government of the 
organization is seriously restricted. 
The- collective form, stipulated by Law 391 of September 1972, has been 
elaborated in a 'Manual for the collective enterprises' of April 1974. 
In substance the power, the influence of IAD is based on the situa-
tion, that the land reform institute selects and designates the 
members of the land reform farms, but retains the property of the 
land. The ownership is neither transfered to the individual farmer, 
nor to the collective enterprises. It is true that the Land Reform Law 
of 1962 makes the provision for the formal transfer of the assigned 
land to the farmers, a possibility which is held open explicitly in 
the 1972 law, but in practice IAD has never transfered property 
rights to the farmers. They have a right to use the land, as long as 
they fulfill the conditions established by IAD., The land reform 
institute thus disposes of an instrument which enables it to 
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substitute farmers who in the opinion of IAD are not satisfying the 
rules. 
Formally the influence of the state on the collective farms is based 
on the instruction, that two of the three EC members must be desig-
nated by the state, whereas one of them, the representative of IAD, is 
the President of the EC. The seoond representative of the state • is a 
delegate of the President of the Republic. The third member, the 
representative of the farmers, elected by the GA, finds himself in a 
minority position. 
The representative of IAD in the EC has a right of veto over agree-
ments of the EC which are contrary to the land reform law, the regula-
tions of IAD, or that fall beyond the objectives of the collective 
farm. Although in itself the majority of the representatives of the 
state in the EC is sufficiënt to prevent decisions which are consid-
ered undesirable. In practice this can be done for example by holding 
up requests for financement for other agricultural activities than 
those planned by IAD. Without credit the advance loan which the 
farmers receive during the produetcicle for their subsistence and 
which is paid out every fortnight, is also cancelled. 
Although the GA formally is the superior organism of the collectives, 
it is stipulated that a valid decision of the assembly should have the 
approval of the IAD representative. 
The General Assembly (GA) 
The GA is formed by the members of the collective farm. The assembly 
must meet every 2 months, or at the request of the EC, IAD or the mem-
bers. A decision obtains validity if minimally half plus one of the 
members present agree with it and it also has the approval of the IAD 
representative. From among themselves the GA members elect a represen-
tative who on behalf of the farmers has a seat in the EC and repre-
sents the assembly to outsiders. Among and by the GA the members of 
the different committees are elected. 
The next important tasks of the GA include: to pronunciate itself on 
the policy of the collective enterprise, among other things by approv-
ing the production program and deciding over the distribution of the 
net return of the farm. The GA lays down the constitution and the re-
gulations of the collective. 
The Executive Committee (EC) 
The EC is in charge of the administration of the collective enterprise 
according to the law, the objectives of the collective farm, and the 
decisions of the GA. In particular the EC is charged with: 
drawing up internal regulations concerning the labor regime, a 
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draft of which should be presented to the GA. 
proposing the GA eventual disciplinary measures against members who 
don't fulfill the regulations of the collective farm and decisions 
taken by the assembly. 
attending the external contacts of the enterprise, with public and 
private institutions (such as applications for credit). 
- entering in contracts for , the buying of prime materials, inputs, 
including machinery. 
entering in contracts for the selling of the produce of the farm. 
- managing, administrating and controlling of the finance of the 
enterprise. 
- in cooperation with the regional office of IAD provide for the 
bookkeeping of the enterprise, including the financial relations of 
the individual members with the collective (advance loans, income 
share). 
- drawing up the profit and loss account and present it to the GA. 
The Committees 
The committees belong with the EC to the executing bodies of the col-
lective enterprise. The committees assist the EC by the carrying out 
of the activities. The 'Manual' of 1974 indicates that the different 
committees each are formed by three members, in practice there are 
often more, eventually the membership of the committees is raised so 
'that all members belong to one or another committee. On the collective 
farms there should be at least six committees: respectively for pro-
duction, credit, discipline, buying, selling and social affairs. Some-
times one finds a committee for training and schooling. 
The formal organization of the collective model is indicated in Fig.1. 
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Figure 1. Dominican Republic Organigram of the Collective 
Land Reform Farms 
General Assembly 
(GA) 
President of the Republic 
Land Reform 
Institute - IAD 
Administrator 
IAD Project 
Committees Representative Farmers - Representative IAD 
Delegate of the President in the Board 
production credit. discipl. inputs market. soc.affairs 
12 
The 'associative' (or intermediate) model in principle nas an admini-
strative structure eorresponding with the collective enterprise. Many 
aspects which in the collective model are managed centrally stay that 
way: the property and use of the agricultural machinery, the buying of 
the means of production, the liability for the credit, the supervision 
on the activities of the members even if these have been mainly indi-
vidualized and the sale of the produce of the farm. In the administra-
tion the emphasis shifts from maintaining the workdlscipline in col-
lective production, to preventing that individual members disarrange 
the centralised activities (such as planned machine-work, irrigation, 
spraying of pesticides), or to prevent that individual members give 
evidence to be unable to pay-off their share in the collective credit. 
The existing adminsitrative structure need not to be adjusted for this 
model. But simultaneously with the approval of the 'associative' model 
by IAD a number of changes was introduced in that structure. Thus the 
delegate of the President of the Republic has disappeared from the EC. 
The farmers now have two representatives, that is a majority in the 
E.C. But the influence of IAD is maintained, with the words of the 
Manual: the members share the administration and the management (of 
the enterprise) with the state. Thus the IAD representative in the EC 
has kept the right of veto (12). 
In practice the selected representative of the farmers is the one who 
daily manages the farm. Where the members are subdivided in permanent 
'groups, the leaders of these groups (brigades), the so-called 'liste-
ros', assist the representative of the farmers, they supervise the 
activities of their groups and pay out according to these activities 
the two-week advance loan. 
The president of the production committee, sometimes the one of disci-
pline, takes a central part in the planning and the assignment of the 
work. As . president of the committees often persons are elected with 
organizational skills or other capabilities. One can say that the re-
presentative, the groupleaders and the chairpeople of the committees 
form together the internal leadership of the collective farms. 
4. Rjghts and duties of the members of the collective farms 
IAD has - as observed - in no single case transfered the property of 
the land to the farmers. The farmers have through membership of the 
collective enterprise received a right to use the land, a right to 
work (collectively) the assigned land and to enjoy the income from 
these activities. On the other hand the farmers, who receive this 
right to use the land for nothing, have the duty to contribute with 
their labor according to the regulations of the collective model and 
the specific arrangements on this point in each of the enterprises. 
13 
Yet the right of the farmers on access to the land and their duty to 
provide their labor are not entirely dissoluble connected to each 
other. It is provided that members in case of illness, old age or 
authorized absence send a substitute, without loosing their claim on a 
share of the net return of the enterprise. That is to say in prin-
ciple it is possible to disconnect the right on a share in the net 
return of the farm and the own labor contribution. Substitution will 
increase the more members reach their old age. But is will also occur 
more frequently, in as far as the possibilities for members to find 
better paid activities outside the farm increase. 
The original legislation stipulates that the net returns of the col-
lective enterprise should be distributed equally among the members. As 
these regulations were elaborated in 1974 IAD has determined that 
surplus distribution should be according to the contribution of each 
member in workdays. In practice, however, the registration of the 
related data is inadequate, in such a way that the factual distribu-
tion approaches an equal distribution among members. 
Members are not permitted to alienate the rights which result from the 
membership of the collective enterprise. There is a right to descend. 
When a member dies IAD is obliged to offer the. right of membership 
first to the heirs. 
The members further have the right to participate in the elections for 
the different organism of the collective enterprise and be elected in 
'these bodies. They also have the right to request a control of the 
books of the enterprise in order to call attention to supposed irregu-
larities. Also, to make use of the collective provisions which have 
been set up for the benefit of the members. The members are obligated 
to take part in the meetings of the GA, to observe the constitution 
and the regulations of the collective and to obey the instructions of 
the GA, the EC and the committees. 
The most important obligation of the farmers is, to contribute with 
their labor according to the labor regime of the collective enter-
prise. The intermediate model implies exactly a change in the labor 
regime. Collective work is substituted for individual responsibility 
for all manual activities on a specific parcel. The distribution of 
the income also changes: the individual production, that is to say the 
yield of a determinate parcel assigned to a specific member, now 
becomes an important element of this distribution, but need not be the 
only criterium. 
The individual members are not allowed to install physical boundaries 
around the parcel of land which has been assigned to them, in order to 
prevent that the collective, centrally managed activities are hinder-
ed. It is also not allowed to sell for own account (a part of) the 
produce, as this produce holds as guarantee for the credit received. 
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15 
appeared in the sixties and seventies; in that period the animal trac-
tion has been substituted by tractors, the sickle by the combine, and 
spraying by airplane has become popular. The collective farms in 
general dispose of their own machines, the individual farmers have to 
hire machine-services, which does not proceed without difficulties. 
The irrigated cultivation of rice presents a number of economies of 
scale which contribute in making this erop a relatively profitable 
one. The possibilities which irrigation offers are especially used 
effetively when one succeeds in reaching more than one harvest a year. 
Mechanization then already soon is a condition to reduce labor peaks 
connected with soil preparation and harvest. The economies of scale in 
rice cultivation refer especially to those two elements: irrigation 
and mechanization. 
Irrigation is a complex system in which especially water distribution 
and maintenance of the constructed infrastructure become more compli-
cated if more farms are involved. If more farmers are using the same 
irrigation canal then there will appear problems of planning and 
coordination. The demand for water must be planned in the time and the 
activities of the farmers coordinated, in such a manner that •they 
don't hinder each other. For example the soil preparation of a farmer 
should not be hindered by his neighbour who already started to irri-
gate. The maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure also requires 
cooperation, especially for those collective structures not belonging 
'to individual farms. In big farms, thus also in collective enterprises 
these problems are internalized and are far more simple to resolve. In 
general terms thus scale is an advantage in irrigation. 
In mechanization of rice cultivation there are also economies of 
scale. Working with larger areas reduces machine-time and machine-
costs, makes it more efficiënt to employ machinery. Thus on larger 
farms it is worthwhile to use for the wet soilpreparation heavier 
tractors instead of the small cultivators. It also pays on large farms 
to use airplanes for spraying pesticides, because the reduced preci-
sion is less problematic than on smaller farms. 
Division of labor plays a significant role on the collective rice 
farms. Activities which require specific skills are realized by 
members who dispose of such capacities. On the farms which were studi-
ed this referred to irrigation, broadcasting of pre-germinated seed in 
water and the operation of the agricultural machinery. This division 
of labor and the connected specialization give the larger collective 
and associative farms an advantage over the smaller individual 
producers. 
The joint buying of inputs, the selling of produce and the collective 
credit imply not only a stronger position to negotiate with external 
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relations, but the centralization of these activities also yields a 
considerable time saving when compared to what individual farmers each 
on its own should spend in dispatching these activities. 
There are no professional managers from outside in the collective rice 
farms, although the IAD representative in the E.C. someti-mes functions 
as such. Bringing in the human capital of an outside manager in a col-. 
lective farm implies economies of scale. But these economies do not 
appear in the Dominican case in management, but in extension activi-
ties and supervision of credit. There the extensionist and credit 
supervisors can work with groups and not with individual farmers. 
On the collective farms such economies of scale indeed seem to be 
present. Some data for comparison referring to labor- and machine 
hours on collective and individual ricefarms which were studied on 
these aspects show this (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Dom.Rep. Labor- and machinehours per ha of irrigated rice 
on collective and individual land reform farms - 1985 I 
labor hours 
maintenance . i r r iga t ion and drainage 
seed-bed in system of t ransplant ing 
so i lp repara t ion and 'planting 
maintenance of the erop 
harvest , by hand and ass i s tance by 
machine-harvesting 
Unskilled labor total 
Skilied labor total 
coll.farms indiv.farms 
(hours p.ha) (ho urs p.ha) 
38.9 25.2 
5.9 23.2 
146.2 182.5 
98.3 125.6 
17.9 78.5 
307.2 
22.3 
435.0 
37.0 
machine hours 
soil preparation - dry with tractor 3.3 4.8 
wet with tractor 0.7 0.8 
wet with cultivator 1.9 3-3 
wet with oxen 0.6 0.4 
- harvest with combine 
Yield (paddy in kilogram per ha) 
1.7 
4983 
2.3 
5351 
Source: fieldwork 
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The results of this comparison go in the direction of an on the aver-
age considerable higher employment of labor- and machine-hours on the 
individual ricefarms in relation with those on the collective farms. 
The numbers concerning unskilled labor and tractor hours are both 
about 40 percent higher on the individual farms. In spite of the 
somewhat higher fysical yields on the individual farms (approximately 
7 percent) the return per labor-hour and per machine-hour are higher 
on the collective farms. 
Of course, there is not a single interpretation in that sense, that 
these disparities can be imputed completely to differences in scale of 
the production. One part of the difference is a consequence of 
variation in the labor market. The individual farms of Maizal used in 
the maintenance of the erop, especially in weeding, cheap Haltian 
labor which was actually contracted by a neighbouring sugar enter-
prise. The daily wage of these workers was half of what was paid to 
Dominican agricultural labor. Further, because the drainage system of 
these farms worked less well - as such related to the scale of the 
system - machines could not be used in the same degrée for harvesting 
on these individual farms. Other casual factors play a role, such as 
the incidence of pests. Yet it can be assumed that difference in size 
is an important explaining variable. Technical and organizational 
economies of scale do intermingle. 
The collective rice farms employed, according to the investigation 
'which was carried out in the first semester of 1981, more labour time 
in the maintenance of the irrigation system, the cleaning of the 
canals, the repair of structures, also those on secondary level where 
individual farmers are less able to organize maintenance. Therefor the 
collective farms will have less difficulties in operating the 
irrigation system. 
This is of influence on all the other activities, such as soil prepa-
ration, weedcontrol, harvesting. The easier operation was perceptible 
in the time needed for irrigation: 9 hours per ha on the collective 
farms, against 11.3 on the individual ones. Although in this respect 
it is also important to notice that on the collective farms this job 
is performed by specialized labor. 
Other activities where labor-saving was evident, concerned the prepa-
ration and maintenance of seedbeds, 5.9 against 23.3 hours per ha and 
the application of fertilizers: 6.7 hours per ha against 11.4 hours. 
In using agricultural machinery the element of being able to dispose 
of them on the right moment is very important. The machinery can then 
be employed when soil conditions are good, or in harvesting, when the 
erop has ripened sufficiently. These circumstances can make that the 
collective farms, which have own machinery at their disposal, can 
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employ them more effectively than individual farmers. All the collec-
tive farms had their own tractors, Vasquez Quitero also had its own 
combine. 
On the collective farms a substantial amount of time is saved, as the 
external contacts in connection with credit, buying of means of 
production, selling of rice, is attended by a small number of members 
in the committees. Further, the position to negotiate with machine 
contractors and merchants is stronger for the collective farms, which 
finds its expression in tariffs and prices. 
2. Mobilization of the members: stimuli from outside 
The members of the collective farms were selected by the government; 
formerly most of them were landless farm workers. As they worked main-
ly on large private farms, they had some experience with working in 
groups. On one of the farms studied, El Pozo, all the members have 
been farm workers on the private enterprise which preceded the land-
reform farm. The changes which take place at the transformation to the 
collective model are relatively small as far as direct labor is con-
cerned. But there was nearly any experience with collective manage-
ment. 
One aspect that, especially in the beginning, mobilized the farmer in 
-favor of the collective model, was the improvement in their social and 
economie position which appeared possible on the collective ricefarms. 
The former farm workers saw their income more than doubling. The mem-
bership of the collective enterprise provided the farmers some degree 
of income, which they did not know before. The members of the collec-
tive ricefarms in Esperanza in 1977 also got at their disposal a 
house, an assignment related to the membership of the collective 
farms. 
All in all therè was some basis for mobilization of the farmers for 
collective production, existing in the former experience with group-
work, in the improvement of their incomes and the privilege which the 
collective farms had as far as credit and extension was concerned. 
At the other hand, the style of mobilization for collective production 
used by the state was absolutely not based on participation of the 
farmers in establishlng the collective model. This model was imposed 
on the farmers in a burocratic way, and IAD nas, even in the develop-
mental stage, difficulties with the transfer of power and responsibi-
lities to the farmers concerned. This burocratic style of IAD caused, 
that too much fundamental problems which the farmers experienced in 
the collective model were not resolved by the land reform institute 
and were not even discussed. This was the case of the 'free riding' 
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problem, which was mentioned before, the lacking of possibilities to 
employ family labor and to cultivate food crops for home consumption. 
The consequence was, that in course of time the farmers concerned ap-
peared less and less prepared to accept the collective model. 
3. Conflicting objectives between actors 
The policy of the state related to the ricesector is aimed at Increas-
ing the production with the objective to segure national selfsuffi-
ciency. It also is considered important to have a considerable degree 
of control of production and distribufeion of rice, as it refers to a 
basic necessity. 
The land reform measures in the rice sector served also to concede to 
the pression of landless labor and peasant to get access to agricul-
tural land. The unrest in rural areas, which found its expression in 
land occupations and diminishing support for the government in those 
areas in the elections of 1970, foreed to land reform measures. The 
reduced extent of this program - in the period 1973-1977 10,000 ha 
were given out to 2,800 farmers - showed that this aspect became less 
important after the elections of 1974. 
The collective model which was initiated by the state mainly because 
of the control function, clashed with the aspirations of the farmers. 
Especially because the state sticked to a direct control through the 
'administrative structure of the collective farms, instead of using 
positive incentive to bring in line farmers' and state interests. 
The members of the collective enterprises see as their objective the 
increase of the net surplus of the farm. They experience the rigid 
collective model with its sub-optimal employment of labor as a serious 
obstacle to this end. As far as their own labor is concerned the in-
adequate employment of labor is a consequence of the so-called 'free 
rider' problem and as far as it refers to family labor this has to do 
with the incompatibility with the collective model (see further par. 
III.7 and III.8). 
In fact the farmers and the state came into conflict on the system of 
ratoon cultivation (17). In the ratoon system after the first harvest 
a second erop is grown, by letting the cutted plants, which already 
stooled, shoot anew. This system, which gives a lower fysical yield 
than when the second erop is planted anew, derives its attraction from 
the reduced costs of such a second harvest, because soilpreparation 
and planting can be dropped and less inputs are required. Incidently 
not all rice varieties are equally suitable for ratoon cultivation. 
From the national rice program continuous pressure is excersized on 
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the farmers to substitute the ratoon cultivation by a second erop 
planted anew, because this results in a higher rice production. As of-
ten is the case with programs aimed at one specific product, it occurs 
also in the rice program, that there is a one-sided emphasis on pro-
duction objectives. These objectives become so dominant, that effi-
ciency considerations shift to a second plan. From a national economie 
point of view the question is if the extra costs for machine use and 
inputs for a second planting is compensated by the extra production of 
rice in this system. The farmers consider, that if ratoon cultivation 
is possible, this is an attractive proposition because it reduces the 
expenditures and thus the risks. 
IAD used in such cases its majority in the EC to block the credit sol-
licited for a ratoon erop to the Agricultural Bank and thus forced 
some of the collective farms to planting anew for a second erop. On 
the collective farm Vasquez Quintero this sanction was applied in 1978 
and 1980. The state in this case choose an explicit buroeratic instru-
ment to fight out the conflict. The development of collective agricul-
ture as a matter of fact requires, that in such confliets of interests 
the autonomy of the collective is not affected. This requires that the 
state keeps sufficiënt feeling with the collective sector in order to 
be able to direct the development by global means (18). 
A decrease of the returns of the rice farms, through the setting of 
the price by INESPRE, causes the members of the collective enterprises 
to develop more and more activities outside the farm and have their 
'place taken in by a substitute. Direct intervention by the government 
through sanctions against the members concerned stands opposite global 
measures to improve returns. The last approach incentivates the 
farmers to participate in the collective work, the former weakens the 
autonomy of the collective enterprises. 
The collective model relnforces the class conflict in the rural sec-
tor. This is clearly the case in relation to the landless farm workers 
hired in in the peak periods. The collective ricefarm behaves as a 
capitalistic enterprise. The Vasquez Quintero farm thus came in con-
flict with the neighbouring farm workers, when in 1977 the enterprise 
eliminated the labor intensive transplanting of the rice. 
As the collective farms have adequate scale for mechanization and the 
government promotes mechanization through the exchange rate and credit 
policy, important activities which formerly asked much hand labor 
(weeding, harvesting) are now mechanized. The employment for 
agricultural labor has been reduced by these eireumstances. Possibly 
this is also the case on large private ricefarms, but on the collec-
tive farms'the members themselves are protected against such a reduc-
tion in their employment by their membership, in such a way that 
landless labor is worse off in the case of collective farms. 
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k. Relations with external instltutions 
Because of the absence of technical and organizational capacities and 
of oapital, there is a neoessity for the state, especially in the 
beginning, to support the collective farms. In this support the right 
balanoe must be found, in such a way that on the one hand the collec-
tive enterprises are integrated into the national economy, but at the 
other hand avoiding that the engagement of the state creates dependen-
cy, which reduces the involvement and responsibility of the members. 
For the collective ricefarms the important relations are with: 
the agricultural bank in the area of credit. 
the ministry of agriculture in connection with extenslon services 
and the provision of means of production. 
- the irrigation institute for the distribution of water and the 
maintenance of the infrastructure. 
- the state marketing institute concerning the sale of rice. 
- private traders for inputs and machinery, machine contractors and 
rice millers. 
IAD has a mediating role, in the first place in bringing about these 
relations, later on in seeing that the collective enterprises can 
manage their own external relations independently. 
The credit relation shows the intermediary role of IAD with respect to 
the Agricultural Bank. Credit is important to provide the collective 
'farms with capital, in such a way that they can operate independently. 
Using this credit in such a manner that it can be payed off timely and 
completely, prevents that the enterprises come in a situation of 
dependency in relation to the creditors. 
The credit relations of the dominican collective farms are in this 
respect well organized. De short term credit is well planned and IAD 
and bankemployees supervise the use of the credit. The inputs which 
are bought by the farms in agreement with IAD are paid by the bank 
directly to the providers of the means of production. The payment of 
other items doesn't take place without inspection of and reporting 
about the progress of the activities. Last but not least the money 
produce of the rice sales are directly transfered to the bank, which 
pays off the outstanding debts before remitting the money to the col-
lective enterprise. 
These procedures have resulted in a paying off rate of the collective 
rice farms which is high in comparison with other collective and indi-
vidual land reform farms and with private farmers (20). 
The collective farms also have had an ample access to medium term 
credit for the purchase of machinery. This financement is mainly 
procured by the dealers. They provided total financing, in such a way 
that the farmers didn't need to first form an investment fund, some-
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thing which is rather difficult in any collective enterprise (21). The 
paying off of this credit is tuned to the returns of the investment: 
payment takes place from the machine cost item of the short term 
production credit. The Agricultural Bank cooperates in these transac-
tions. 
The rather ample and timely credit provision and the well defined pay-
ing off regulations mak e that the collective enterprises have at their 
disposal working capital and fixed capital, without being dependent on 
the creditors by overdue debts. 
IAD considers this situation to result from the intensive supervision 
it exeersizes on the credithandling of the collective farms. As such 
this might be right. But in the mean time many collective enterprises 
have gained enough experience to be able to enter into a more indepen-
dent credit relation with the bank. 
The collective rice farm Vasquez Quintero proposed in 1983 to replace 
the one production credit for the whole farm, for three eredits one 
for each of the three parts which conform the farm and which each of 
them have different planting - and harvesting dates. Under the 
collective model, however, IAD was not prepared to accept this change. 
In the relations between the collective enterprises and other govern-
ment institutes the intermediary role of IAD is much more reduced. The 
payment of inputs and irrigation tariffs runs through the bank and 
-this is the case with the monetary return of the farms. So there is no 
need for IAD to interfere in this relations separately. Through the 
committees the farmers have gained enough experience in negotiating 
the purchase of inputs and the sale of the produce. 
The collective enterprises between them can associate in an organiza-
tion of a second degree in order to deal together with outside rela-
tions. This can be done because of economie objectives, but also moti-
vated by political reasons. 
The four collective farms in Esperanza have formed with other enter-
prises in that region a consumption cooperative. There are in total 18 
collective farms with 463 members. The farmers have credit in this co-
op which is paid-off with a part of the two week advance they receive 
from the production credit and the remainder is cleared at the end of 
the harvest from the surplus of production. 
There is also intercollective cooperation aimed at realizing economies 
of scale. In 1981 the enterprises Ramia B and Jicomé bought together a 
tractor, which is used according to clearly defined arrangements on 
the two farms, whereas also paid machine work is done for third 
parties. 
The collective farm Vasquez Quintero has together with 22 other col-
23 
lective enterprises formeel an association of a more political struc-
ture. This organization has played a deoisive role in the acceptation 
by the state of the 'associative model'. 
INTERNAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS 
5. Si ze of the colleotive enterprises 
Normally the size of the collective ricefarm is determined in the 
first instance by the area of the private farm taken over by the land 
reform. On the basis of the rule that per farmer 3 to 4 hectares of 
irrigated land is assigned, IAD determines the number of benefioia-
ries. The collective ricefarms thus have different sizes, from 6 to 8 
farmers on the smaller ones rising till near to 100 in some cases. 
At this stage, however, economie and social considerations should be 
taken into account. The economie factors, economies of scale of tech-
nical and organizational character and connected with the strength 
with which the collective enterprises can negotiate, urges in the 
direction of larger units, social considerations, especially those 
related to the actlve participation of the members in management and 
decision-making and to the organization of collective work indicate 
more in the direction of reducing the size. Much will depend in this 
respect on the homogeneity of the .group (22). 
These economie and social factors should, when the collective enter-
'prises are being formed, be balanced. In all cases a certain period of 
experimenting and making adjustments is required. 
IAD when establishing the collective ricefarms has not or hardly com-
pared the economie and social implications and has left the farmers 
little or no room for experiments and adjustments. 
The economie factors, especially the economies of scale, have been 
discussed amply in par. III.1. There the accent was on the role of the 
state' and the relation between state and farmers. In this paragraph 
social factors are considered and the emphasis is on the farmers and 
their relations to the group. 
Because IAD gave little attention to the social aspects and was little 
prepared to take into account the organizational problems of the 
enterprises, the farmers themselves had to look for Solutions. In this 
they experienced more opposition than cooperation from IAD. Many of 
the adjustments thus were made without the knowledge of IAD, some-
times, as in the case of Ramia B, the farmers appealed directly to the 
President of the Republic. 
From the enterprises in the study the smallest one, El Pozo, with only 
13 members reported less difficulties with the labor discipline, with 
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the participation in management. Not only the size, but also the homo-
geneity of the group of farmers, which shared their past as landless 
labor in the former private farm and lived near to each other, played 
a significant role. 
All the other collective farms have invested much effort in experi-
ments and adjustments and in discussions on these with IAD. In par. 
II.2 already an enumeration was given of the changes which the farmers 
themselves have introduced in the enterprises. From these it is clear, 
that based especially on the problems with collective work, they con-
tinually aimed at reducing the groups and making them more homoge-
neous, by using criteria as the village of origin or the place were 
members live for splitting the groups. In the enterprises in the study 
the experiments with further subdivision continued, as long as the 
groups consisted of more than 20 members. 
In the following paragraphs several of these social aspects and orga-
nizational problems will come back. 
6. Management and decision-making 
Effective participation of the members in the decision-making process 
of the enterprise is needed in order to maintain involvement in the 
collective cause. 
For an active and meaningful participation of the members a substan-
tial degree of autonomy of the collective enterprise is required in 
'connection with decisions on production, investment and distribution 
of profits. Also the members must dispose of certain capacities in 
this area (23). 
In the beginning, of course, the experience of the farmers with com-
mercial agriculture and collective production was limited. That ex-
plains why the state at the introduction of the collective model de-
termined,. that its representatives must have a majority in the E.C. of 
the collective farms. Although in the course of time the experience of 
the farmers grew and they informally already took important deci-
sions, IAD refused to adapt the formal structure. Only in 1985 when 
the associative model was accepted by IAD the farmers did acquire the 
majority in the E.C. 
The land reform institute has contributed little to further the parti-
cipation of the farmers in management and decision-making. The farmers 
made themselves strong to dominate the actual management and to bring 
about a substantial degree of participation of the members. The push-
ing back of IAD is also a consequence of a lack of attention from the 
land reform institute for the farmers and the collective farms. This 
found its expression in the rapid change of personnel, the appointment 
of officials without experience in the EC of the collective enter-
prises and in the lack of means of transport, which reduced the direct 
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contact with the farmers. 
On none of the collective enterprises a professional manager was ap-
pointed. The collective ricefarms are specialized in a erop in which 
the farmers already had experience. The running of the enterprise is 
relatively simple, thus it was considered that such a specialized 
function was not needed. 
The bookkeeping of the collective farms was done by IAD, a department 
of the regional office of the institute offers this service to all the 
collective farms in the region concerned. 
The important decisions on the collective farms refer to, as observed, 
production, investment and distribution of the net surplus. The most 
complicated aspect is that of organizing the collective work (see par. 
III.7). 
The formulation of the production plan on the collective ricefarms has 
in many respect got a routine character. For the moment there is 
little discussiön about the question if rice must stay the main erop. 
The important decisions refer to the determination of the variety to 
cultivate, the application or not of the ratoon system and the choice 
of certain cultivation practices, such as direct sowing or transplant-
ing, weeding or spraying pesticides, hand harvesting or with the com-
bine. Important decisions in that respect have in the course of time 
be taken in the different collectives. In Vasquez Quintero for example 
'the transplanting of rice was eliminated in 1977, in 1978 other rice 
varieties were chosen and a combine was purchased in 1979. 
Such decisions in general are subject of preliminary talks among the 
members before a deeision is taken in the general assembly. First a 
kind of consensus is formed. 
The investment decisions are made easier, by the indicated access to 
medium term credit, because this prevents on forehand a laborious dis-
cussion on saving or paying out the net profit of the production. The 
consequence of this way of capital formation is, that the collective 
farms only dispose of a reduced own capital. 
Under the collective model the rules for the distribution of the farms 
net result were fixed. Distribution in theory took place on the basis 
of number of days contributed by each of the members. As this, how-
ever, was not properly registrated, in practice the distribution came 
to an approximately equal share in the net surplus for every member 
(see par. III .7 ). 
On Vasquez Quintero there was in 1981 a broad consensus under the 
farmers to change this system. As from 1978 every member already work-
ed on individual parcel, that is they performed all the manual work on 
that part of the farm. Now they wanted to individualize all the eosts 
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but also the returns of these parcels. The representative of the farm-
ers in the EC of that year, was not prepared to take for his account 
the introduction of this change. That made this matter to the main 
stake of the elections on the farm of the representatives of the 
farmers in the management for 1982. After a thorough preparation in 
1983 the new system of distribution was introduced in Vasquez Quinte-
ro. But because IAD did not approve the change and neither was willing 
to cooperate with the needed adjustments in the bookkeeping and admi-
nistration, the enterprise was forced not only to establish a complete 
shadow administration, but also to undo the distribution of the net 
surplus effectuated by IAD and repeat this OB the basis agreed by the 
members. 
Of course the participation of the members diminishes in the degree 
that the decisions get more a routine character. That can be observed 
on the farms in the study. The management and decision-making process 
then comes in the hands of a small group of members with management 
capacities. Those members replace each other in the main positions, 
those of representative of the farmers and chairmen of the committees. 
That causes a certain internal stratification in the collectives. But 
when important decisions are taken, as the one discussed for Vasquez 
Quintero, the farmers and their leaders bring about an ample partici-
pation in the decision-making. 
The management functions of the collective enterprises are not remu-
'nerated, the status of these functions is the main ground for the wil-
lingness to fulfill them. As far as the administrative tasks permit, 
the members in management functions participate in the manual work on 
the farm. On Vasquez Quintero during some time (for example the prepa-
ration of the change in the distribution system) the work on the 
Individual parcel of the representative of the farmers was taken over 
by others. 
Summing up one can say, that' the situation on the collective farms was 
not very favorable for promoting an active participation of the 
members in management and decision-making. The level of 'schooling of 
the farmers was low, the IAD officials played a dominating role in the 
area of technical knowledge, finance, administration, the collectives 
nearly formed investment funds and the planning was mostly a routine 
matter. IAD showed very little attention for the social aspects. 
Through pression, however, the farmleaders succeeded in dominating 
more and more the management and decision-making. They also tried to 
increase the degree of participation of the members, because a broad 
participation is a base for their leadership. 
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7. The organization of labor 
Most of the farmers have had in the past experience in the rice culti-
vation with working in groups. But that was as a farmworker, thus the 
proper organization of the work was new to them. Some members had some 
experience as foreman. According to the rules eaoh collective enter-
prise had to draft up regulations, which determine the labor-regime. 
But on the farms studied such regulations were never formulated. The 
committees for production and for discipline arrange the collective 
work on an informal way. 
At the time of the study the enterprises in Esperanza still worked 
according to the collective model. 
On El Pozo and Jicomé, the smaller farms with respectively 13 and 20 
farmers, work was performed in one group. On the large farms Ramia A 
and B each with 35 members the farmers normally worked in two or more 
groups, brigades. The number and size of the brigades depended on the 
nature of the activities to be performed. The composition of the 
groups and the distribution of the work activities was arranged by the 
chairman of the production committee. Most of the farmers nearly 
always worked in the same group. 
Some specific tasks, such as supervising hired labor and the spraying 
of Chemicals were continuously assigned by the G.A. to different mem-
bers, in order to promote that everybody ïearned these jobs. 
For other tasks, which require certain capacities, such as machine 
operation, irrigation, broadcasting in water of pre-germinated rice 
seed, the administration of the warehouse, at least on the larger 
farms, specific members were in charge. 
The most serious problem when working in groups is the question of the 
work discipline of the members. This refers to the presence on the 
work as well as the pace and quality of the work. During the study 
non-authorized absence of members was recorded daily over a period of 
two months. On Ramia A where work discipline was problematic, on the 
average 20 percent of the members were absent without permission, on 
Ramia B 10 percent. This absence was not registrated by the farms 
themselves and thus was not sanctioned. That is to say, this absence 
was not reflected in a reduction of the number of labordays that for a 
specific member counted for the calculation of nis share 'in the net 
return of the enterprise. 
In extreme cases a member is ejected from the collective, normally 
through IAD, and substltuted by somebody else. This has taken place 
already sometimes on Ramia A and on El Pozo. But the farmers are not 
willing in less outspoken situations to apply sanctions mutually. Liv-
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ing together in one village, the relations between the members them-
selves, but also between their respective wives and family members, 
make it very difficult to propose or to support sanctions against a 
fellow-member consisting of a reduction in that member's two weekly 
advance or his share in the profit distributed. 
The average and normal workday on the collective rice farms in the 
study amounted over the whole production cyclus to no more than 6 
hours a day. Only in exceptional cases the farmers worked in the 
afternoon. Saturday they worked only 4 hours and normally no work was 
done on sunday. 
The farmers were of the opinion, that in general the work pace when 
working oollectively is lower than working individually. On Ramia A 
members sometimes asked for a day-task, which they performed in two 
third or half the time, after which they participated in transplant-
ing, an activity which was paid on a piece rate basis. They thus work-
ed as hired in labor on their own enterprise. 
On Vasquez Quintero the farmers since 1978 worked individually. All 
the members have been assigned an equal parcel of land, where they are 
responsible, as an individual farmer, for all the work. That also in-
cludes the centrally performed activities as land-preparation, the 
sowing, irrigation and harvesting which they have to supervise. All 
the manual labor involved is completely for the account of the member 
' concerned, who also receives the credit component for hiring in labor. 
He then can decide for himself if he wants to perform that part of the 
work himself, to use his family labor or if he actually hires the 
labor. 
The non-authorized absence and the low pace of work was considered by 
the farmers as a serious objection of the collective model. From the 
comparison of the farms in the study one can deduct, that the smaller 
and more homogeneous the group, the smaller the difficulties of the 
collective work. 
As such, this is not a surprising conclusion, but it was astonishing 
that IAD gave so little attention to the problems of the collective 
farms in this area. There is more room for manoeuvring for the collec-
tive enterprises to introducé changes in the labor regime when IAD's 
presence on the farm is less explicit. Many changes were made without 
the knowledge of the land reform institute. 
Another aspect of the organization of labor on the collective farms is 
the restriction of the use of family labor. In the collective model 
the members are not prepared to employ their family members on the 
farm without payment. Reversely, the enterprise has difficulties in 
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hiring-in those family members of the farmers, who are not able to 
perform on an equal level with a grown-up farm worker. The consequence 
is, that only when if refers to pieee work, as in the case of trans-
planting, family labor is employed. 
For the farmers this situation unnecessarily increases the expenses 
for, hiring in labor and it reduces the net return of the enterprise 
and also the family income. From a national economie point of view 
there will only be a loss of labor, when in peak periods labor short-
ages occur and family members are not employed, nor on other farms 
either. Also, when certain activities are omitted, as for example 
weeding, which beyond a certain limit are no longer performed when a 
market wage has to be paid, but which are done through (self-)exploi-
tation of the family labor of the farmer. 
For the farmers the possibility to employ family labor is a heavy 
argument in favor of the individual farm and against the collective 
model. 
The study, which took place during the complete production cycle of 
the first semester of 1981, looked into the ratio between the labor 
produced by the farmers themselves, the family labor and the hired 
labor. In Table 4 the results are shown. 
Table 4. Dom.Rep. - Hours of labour per ha irrigated rice 
subdivided in labor by the farmer, family labor and hired 
labor at collective and individual landreform farms (19811) 
Name Rincon Maizal Ramia.B Vasq.Quintero 
type of project indiv. indiv. coll. intermed. 
number of questioned farmers 20 20 35 63 
ha per farmer 4-00 2-70 2-63 2-83 
hours of labor per ha 358 504 344 316 
labor by the farmer {%) 15 31 68 47 
family labor {%) _15_ _3_ (4) 24 
3.0 34 68 (4) 71 
hired labor {%) _70_ _66_ 32 (28) 29 
100$ 10055 100$ 10055 
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In the case of the individual farmers in Rineon and Maizal, the small 
share of the farmers themselves in the total labor input attracts 
attention, while at Rineon this share is even less than half of the 
share at Maizal. Family labor is responsible for a small share, but is 
uneommonly low for Maizal. On the whole, the farmers and their 
families take approximately one third of the labor input for their 
account, while the other two thirds concern hired labor. 
At the collective farm Ramia B and the intermediate farm Vasquez 
Quintero, the opposite is the case. The farmers themselves and their 
families account for more than two thirds of the labor input, hired 
labor for the rest. 
At the collective farm it is not common for the family members to co-
operate without pay. However, at Ramia B a number of sons of the far-
mers perform hired labor against piece-wage. Their share has been 
stated between brackets. 
At Vasquez Quintero, where labor has been individualized, the farmers 
were able to bring in their family members. Family labor accounts for 
a quarter of the total labor input. In the meantime the share of the 
farmers themselves is higher than that of the individual farmers at 
Maizal and Rineon. 
The differences are caused by a complex of factors. One of the most 
important concerns the scale of production; at the larger farms the 
-activities can be distributed better in time, thus preventing labor-
peaks, which necessitate attracting hired labor. All ricefarms in the 
landreform, the individual as well as the collective, work with ap-
proximately the same techniques and technologies, as set out in par. 
1.2. Under these circumstances important differences arise between the 
two types of enterprise, that relate to the scale of production, 
irrigation and application of machinery, but also to the availability 
of agricultural machines. 
The small-scale individual farms have to rent machinery and, as it 
becomes available, the activities will be carried out within a limited 
span of time. The same applies to irrigation which, within the actual 
distribution system, cannot easily be distributed more evenly in time. 
Therefore manual work shall also have to be completed within a re-
stricted period of time. Finally, to be able to harvest with combines 
on these farmers of often less than 3 ha*s, the rice should ripen 
evenly. The machine contractor will not be prepared to come more than 
once, or only against a higher rate. This concentration in time gives 
rise to labor peaks, and as a result, the labor of the farmer himself 
and his family members, will have to be supplemented with a 
comparatively high amount of hired labor. 
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Figure 2. Dom.Rep. Labourfilm of three types of ricefarms - 1981-1 
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At collective farms, where the scale of production is large, machinery 
is available and/or the farmers have a stronger position to negotiate 
with the machine contractor, activities will be distributed in time as 
much as possible. Irrigation must be evenly distributed in time. At 
Ramia B soil preparation and transplanting was spread out over a 
period of two months. Reduction of labor peaks follows, not only in 
soil preparation and transplanting, , but over the whole production 
cycle. The farmers' share in the total labor input therefore remains 
high. 
At Vasquez Quintero where labor has been individualized, part of the 
flexibility was lost as the scale of production was partially reduced. 
The farm disposes of its own machines and is large enough to spread 
out soil preparation, irrigation and sowing. These activities are in 
fact carried out on a large scale. But for those activities for which 
responsibility lies with the individual members, possibilities to dis-
tribute them in time are few or none. Just as at the individual farms, 
manual work is concentrated in time. The farmers prevent high expenses 
for hired labor by exchanging labor between themselves (7% of the 
total), which is best possible between farmers of three different 
blocks. Besides they carry out hired labor for each other (3$). The 
reduced possibilities to distribute activities, on the other hand al-
lows a broader use of family labor (24$ of the total). Motivation to 
do so is strong, as it was one of the main reasons to individualize 
-' labor. 
The graphs below show the distribution in time of the labor need for 
the average individual farm from the Maizal project, for the collec-
tive Ramia B and for an average individual production unit from the 
intermediate cooperative farm Vasquez Quintero. 
The labor regimen for the individual farm shows, that this type is 
characterized by a high labor peak during the phase of soil prepara-
tion and transplanting and returning peaks for the other activities. 
As noted before, the concentration in time in the first phase is due 
to the shortage of tractors. As a result the soil preparation is 
carried out in one turn. The high peaks implicate a high amount of 
hired labor. The high peaks for weeding again illustrate how the ele-
ment of strong concentration of activities and the availability of 
cheap Haitian hired labor influence each other. The concentration is 
already determined by the foregoing activities, the availability of a 
gang of Haitian workers in itself makes that the activities are carri-
ed out within a very short span of time and with a comparatively high 
amount of hired labor. 
The collective farm exhibits a peak in the phase of soil preparation 
and transplanting as well, but this one is much lower and more evenly 
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distributed in time. All following activities are therefore distribut-
ed in time as well and exhibit relatively few peaks. 
At the intermediate cooperative (associative) farm Vasquez Quintero 
the phase of soil preparation and sowing - instead of transplanting -
shows a peak which, given the difference in planting methods, is 
comparable to that of individual farms. The following activities 
exhibit comparatively lower peaks than those at the individual farms. 
An important role is played by the economies of scale in irrigation, 
fertilizer distribution and spraying of insecticides, which further 
leave more time for continuous weeding. 
At the collective ricefarm Jicomé the labor regimen was again differ-
ent, as the production activities were not spread in time, causing 
labor peaks. The farmers of this farm chose to work hard and long for 
a short period. Between peaks work was easy and if possible the work 
was individualized allowing family members to be brought in. 
The possibilities to distribute activities in time turn out to be -
given the used techniques and technologies - mainly determined by the 
scale of production. The collectives make maximal use of their scale, 
in the intermediate nmodel, the flexibility has been lost to a certain 
extent, as the scale has been partially reduced to the individual 
area. The individual farmers with a limited area are in every way re-
stricted in the distribution of activities. It should be observed, 
, that this is a result of the chosen technique, a high degree of mecha-
nization, which is justified if two harvests per year are realized. 
But besides the scale other factors play a role in the amount of hired 
labor as well as the amount of family labor used. The method of cultl-
vating is of influence. Replacing transplanting by sowing at Vasquez 
Quintero has reduced an important labor peak. In Maizal, during the 
harvest of 1981 I it was impossible to work with the combine during 
the whole period. 
This explains partially why the average total labor input per ha is 
higher than for the other farms, but also why much hired labor was 
used. The division of labor in the collective and the intermediate 
model leads to an important labor saving. 
The conditions of the labor market strongly differ. As stated, at 
Maizal, specifically for weeding, use was made of Haitian farmworkers, 
who earn only half of the current wages. Finally there are for each 
farm specific factors, that influence the organization of the labor: 
localization, soil conditions, climate. With respect to the use of 
family labor, the distance between the farm and the housing, composi-
tion of the family and the view on the importance of education and fu-
ture possibilities to find work outside the agriculture, play a role. 
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8« Recompensation and labor incentives 
The system of recompensation is an important factor in the internal 
organisation of collectives. Experience shows that, in the long term, 
material recompensation is the most important motivation for the 
members. 
The system of recompensation therefore must include economie incen-
tives for the collective production. This applies to the operating 
results as a whole, that is, it is desirable that after deduction of 
the advances to the farmers, that lie near to the wage level in force, 
a surplus remains to be distributed. This must give the members the 
consciousness of being more than wage workers, the feeling that they 
are also joint owner and joint administrator of an enterprise. 
But economie incentives should also originate from the system in indi-
vidual sense. That is to say, for the members there should be a rela-
tion between these individual efforts (devotion and working pace), the 
work carried out (difficulty, demanded skills) dnd the recompensation. 
At most collective farms in the Dominican Republic advances are payed 
out and usually there is a surplus to be distributed. Payment of. ad-
vances takes place as long as there are activities. Between harvests 
there may be a period of two months in which no advances are payed. In 
the determination of the height of advances, the expected production 
is taken into consideration. 
'In 1981 and the preceding years, on the farms that were examined, the 
advances per day were approximately a day's wage of a farmworker. The 
members of the four collective ricefarms in Esperanza, where the 
ratoonsystem is common, usually received advances during a period. of 
10 months in the year. The average payment of the net operating 
results equaled the advances, but varied from 50 to 150% of this 
amount. In this sense the members of the collective ricefarms feit 
they were more than workers on a state-enterprise. 
The relation between individual effort and recompensation gave rise to 
more difficulties. As mentioned, the farmers consider this as a seri-
ous problem of the collective model. Presence and devotion of a part 
of the members leave to be desired. An unauthorised absence of 20 per-
cent, as found for Ramia A, illustrates the problem of 'free-riders'. 
Furthermore the devotion, working pace and accuracy of the members 
working in a group, in the view of the members themselves, is insuffi-
ciënt. In all farms there was discussion about the use of piece-wage 
or assigning day-tasks, but in agriculture possibilities to do so are 
limited. For success in collective production it is essential to 
control the unauthorised absence from the beginning. 
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In this respect the size of a collective farm as Ramia, which started 
with 70 farmers, and of Vasquez Quintero with 63 members, was too 
large. Specific support and attention on this point by the IAD could 
possibly have helped the farmers to overcome their fear of applying 
justified sanctions with respect to their fellow members. 
Measuring and recompensating of unequal performances is a difficult 
problem. It requires introduction of a kind of points system. 
Experience in smaller and more homogenous groups shows that if social 
control in a group is strong enough to keep absence within acceptable 
limits, deviations in labor performances will stay within reasonable 
limits and also that the members give them less importance. 
El Pozo was the only one of the farms that were investigated that did 
not have problems with the labor discipline; at this farm there was 
enough social control in the group. At all other farms, the problems 
on this aspect lead to the explicit conviction that only individualis-
ing of the farmwork could restore the relation between effort and 
recompensation. 
The bookkeeping plays an important role in clarifying the incentive 
structure of the collective farms. For calculation of the surplus and 
judging the factors that determine the profit, a good and fast book-
keeping is required. That the bookkeeping that actually is carried out 
, by IAD does not meet the requirements of the members, shows from the 
fact that a complete parallel bookkeeping is being held at Ramia B as 
well at Vasquez Quintero. 
The progress figures from the shadow bookkeeping of Ramia B were pre-
sented regularly in the general assembly. The discussion on these 
figures stimulates and motivates the involvement of the members with 
the collective and the production process. At Vasquez Quintero it was 
mainly the decision to distribute the surplus on basis of the individ-
ual costs and yields that gave rise to the need of a parallel book-
keeping. For IAD, the collective distribution of profit and the 
supervision of the credit was exactly the reason for wanting a central 
bookkeeping. 
9. Collective versus individual production 
Often at collective farms there is, beside the collective production, 
room for individual production on a piece of. land destined for private 
use. In the light of the difficulties in the relation between individ-
ual effort and-recompensation in the collective production, the mem-
bers want to give the individual production more emphasis. The indi-
vidually worked private land give the possibilitiy to bring in family 
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labor. It is a matter of finding the right balance between collective 
and individual production. 
It is therefore important that collective production remains attrac-
tive, renders a surplus which increases further through improvement of 
productivity; Also, paying advances on basis of the number of days 
worked in the collective production will be beneficial to the motiva-
tion for this form of production. On the other hand, increasing dis-
content with the insufficiënt relation between effort and recompensa-
tion will increase the interest in individual production. 
At the investigated farms, with exception of Vasquez Quintero, the 
individually worked pieces of land did not play an important role. For 
this purpose use was being made exclusively of those parts that were 
unsuitable for rice production; canal banks, verges of roads, of 
canals and drains.' At Vasquez Quintero irrigation and drainage canals 
themselves are used as well for individual rice production , on the 
condition that normal irrigation is possible. At Vasquez Quintero 
every member is allowed to use the verges and banks that border that 
area for which this member is individually responsible. The 
individually worked pieces of land therefore vary in size, from 300 to 
3,000 m2, averaging 2,500 m2. At Vasquez Quintero in 1981 I an 
average of 100 hours of work was spent on these vegetables gardens, 
slightly more than 10 percent of the total labor input. Two thirds was 
'labor by the farmers themselves, one third was family labor. At Ramia 
A only 6 of the 35 farmers disposed of an individual piece of land, at 
Ramia B 13. This situation originates from the time that the 
collectives started and a correction was never made. This indicates to 
a certain extent that these pieces of land or their extension were 
never an important point of discussion. The discussion centered on 
individualising of the rice production itself. 
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IV. TWO ROADS TO INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTION 
1. Problems in the bottom-up approach 
In this case study of the Dominican Republic the collective model was 
imposed by the state. From this point the farmers have, by experiment-
ing, earried through changes and adaptions that have solved or in any 
case diminished problems of labor organisation and management. In this 
way they came to the 'associative', the intermediate model. The ques-
tion is if it is possible to reach this model from the bottom-up and 
on a voluntary basis. Farmers will not easily turn to collective pro-
duction voluntarily. It is conceivable, hówever, that at a certain 
moment an intermediate model of cooperate production will be pursued. 
A form in which scale advantages are being exploited, but the most im-
portant problems of common labor - the 'free rider' problem and that 
of the impossibility to bring in family labor - are being omitted. 
This theme will not be comprehensively discussed, but giving it some 
thought will shed some light on the character of the intermediate 
model. 
In the organizatlon that emanates from the farmers themselves and is 
voluntary, what matters most is to realize the potential extent of 
scale economies. These were discussed in par. 1.2 and III.1. Resuming, 
the possibilities lie in: 
irrigation: coordlnation of irrigation on basis of production 
planning; 
collective maintenance of the irrigation system; 
labor distribution. 
mechanization: of soil preparation and harvesting, again generating 
the need for a central planning of production. 
sowing, fertilizer distribution and spraying pesticides: 
division of labor is possible and transport costs will 
be lower. 
management: mainly in the external contacts concerning services as 
credit, purchase of means of production, selling of 
the finished products, irrigation and renting machines. 
On these points there are possibilities to realize scale economies, 
but this is far from simple. Not only should the right steps be taken 
to stimulate the farmers to proceed, but they should also be taken in 
the right order. 
There is a tendency to start with marketing, purchasing and selling. 
While there is an outside pressure to turn the credit into a joint 
credit. From the point of view of the financial institution the joint 
responsibility for the individual credit is attractive, from the 
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farmer's point of view it is one of the major difficulties of the 
intermediate model. Sooner or later the question will arise how to 
cope with members that run into debt. 
Realizlng scale economiess in the production requires coordination of 
the production. Members must delegate part of the decisions to the 
cooperative management. Not the farmers but the central plan of pro-
duction determines time and sequence of the various activities. 
Without this, radical, decision, the scale economies in the field of 
irrigation, use of machines and labor specialization, are not 
practical. The advantage of the first method - first imposing joint 
production and introducing flexibility later on - lies in the fact 
that in this way the farmers experience where and how scale advantages 
are brought about. When problems in management and organization of 
labor have been overcome, farmers are more prepared to leave part of 
the decision competence on a central level and to submit themselves to 
a plan of production. 
2. A case from practice 
The 20 farmers from Rincon, that were included in the comparative in-
vestigation formed part of project AC 18 Rincon, a landreform project 
of 83 individual ricefarms, that started in 1963. The land, 335 ha, 
that was property of the big landproprietor Vidal Torres, in that year 
was distributed between farmworkers and small farmers which received 
, an average of 4-00 ha. By now these farmers have more than 20 years of 
experience as individual producers. Various attempts have been made to 
come to some form of cooperative, either as a result of external pres-
sure, or on their own initiative. Some attempts have failed, but 
specially the fact that after 1972 collective farms were established 
in the direct surroundings, among others Vasquez Quintero, continues 
to be a challenge to come to an organization with comparable scale 
economies. An important point for the individual farms is the fact 
that the collectives have succeeded in building up their own mechani-
cal equipment, while they still encounter great difficulties in this 
field. 
In the period of the investigation - the first semester of 1981 - 76 
of the 83 farmers from the project were united in the 'Asociación 
Padre Fantino'. This cooperative organization developed activities in 
two fields: mechanization and credit. 
On the border of the project the Department of Agriculture had an out-
let for inputs for the rice cultivation, so there was little reason to 
develop cooperative purchasing activities. The intention of the asso-
ciation was to achieve further cooperation. 
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Mechanization. Only one farmer owned a tractor, the rest depended 
on the machine contractor. The supply of machines in the busy time was 
insufficiënt, which leads to problems with the soil preparation and 
harvesting. To be able to carry out - in shifted phases - the complete 
soil preparation, it would be necessary to dispose of 4 tractors. The 
association could dispose only of 3 small cultivators that-were being 
used for wet soil preparation. The machines had been purchased in 1981 
with suppliers credit to the 'asociación', which ex- ploited the 
machines through a special committee it had installed. Operation, 
maintenance and instalments were payed from the proceeds of the 
rental, against commercial rates, to the members. The main problem was 
the lack of a central planning of the agricultural activiti.es in the 
project. The machines were hired on an ad hoc base, the criterion used 
was the urgency of the need of the members, as judged by the 
committee. Of course on this basis no policy can be carried out that 
can satisfy all members. 
Credit. The 'asociación' started in 1980, at request of the 
Agricultural bank and at the instance of IAD, with a joint credit. 
Only 62 of the 76 farmers took part. With exception of those 
collectives where the organization of the credit is good, the credit-
discipline in Dominican landreform projects is very low. In Table 5 
the experience with individual and joint-credit of the farmers that 
started the credit group in 1980 are shown. In 1979 the farmers still 
received individual credit, 27 percent payed off all instalments, 63 
percent a part of it and 10 percent nothing. Of the total contracted 
loan, 30 percent was not payed off on schedule. When in 1980 a start 
was made with groupcredit the situation improved slightly, but the 
'asociación' as a whole, ran into a considerable debt. These debts, 
but also the problem of the position of the collective versus the 
individuals who fail to pay off instalments, put a great strain on the 
'asociación'. 
Table 5. Dom.Rep. Results of individual and joint credit in the 
•Asociación Padre Fantino', Rincon 1979 and 1980 
Number of 
Period Contr. Credit Credit payed off Debt {%) farmers 
1979 I RD$ 165,450 115,086 50,364 (3050 62 
1980 I RD$ 90,618 71,492 19,126 (21%) 59 
II RD$ 74,733 55,083 19,650 {26%) 48 
Experience in this project shows, that reaching an intermediate form 
of cooperative agricultural production from the bottom-up on voluntary 
basis, requires a careful evaluation of the aim the farmers have in 
mind and the steps to be taken to reach this aim. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Dominican State has, in the beginning of the seventies, 
introduced collective agriculture in the rice sector. The 
intention was to reactivate the landreform and, in connection 
with the land reform, to increase the grip on the national rice 
production, which is the main foodcrop in the Dominican Republic. 
In answer to the criticism of large rice farmers that expropria-
tion and redistribution would lead to the loss of scale econo-
mies, the State introduced collective ricefarms as to preserve 
the economies of scale. 
2. Scale economies are the best economie argument to convince 
farmers of the benefit of collective production. The main objec-
tions raised against joint production lie in the problems of man-
agement and organization of labor in the production cooperatives. 
The problem of 'free-riding' and the difficulties in bringing in 
family labor, are the major reasons for the farmers to resist 
this form of enterprise and are a motive to continuously intro-
ducé adjustments into the collective production system. 
3. In the Dominican land reform both individual and collective rice-
farms operate. Both aim at doublé cropping which is made possible 
by irrigation and mechanization. Therefore there is little dif-
ference between the two types in the techniques and technologies 
used. This study suggests that under these circumstances, in fact 
economies of scale arise in large, that is in collective rice-
farms. These advantages can be realized in irrigation, in 
mechanization, in management and in negotiating with external 
contacts. In principle, the choice of the State for collective 
rice production can be considered to be correct. 
4. Management and organization of the labor proved to be the major 
problem for the farmers in the collectives. The Dominican insti-
tute for land reform IAD has done little or nothing to solve 
these problems. The farmers themselves, however, have made a 
great effort experimenting a workable solution. They sought the 
answer in making the groups smaller and more homogenous so to 
intensify social contacts and decrease the possibilities for 
'free-riding'. Further, they aimed at fortifying the relation 
between effort and recompensation. 
5. Great differences were in fact shown between the individual and 
the collective farms with respect to the use of own and family 
labor on the one hand and the hired labor on the other hand. On 
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the individual farms, the farmers' own labor and the family labor 
was less than one third of the total labor input, on the collec-
tives more than two thirds was own labor. This was, among other 
things, the result of a better distribution on the collective 
farms of the various activities, oaused by the larger scale of 
irrigation and the availability of agricultural machines owned by 
the oollective. 
This study specially deals with an experiment in which farmers 
have transformed the oollective model into what they call the 
'associative' model. In this model many activities are still car-
ried out and controlled on a central level (planning, irrigation, 
machine work, extérnal contacts), but manual labor nas been indi-
vidualized. There is hardly any work in groups and there is a 
direct relation between effort and recompensation as every member 
works a specific area and receives its yield. 
Kanel, Reed and Carter point out in their paper 'Collective Farm-
ing: Lessons from Experience' (1985), that t'his form of farming, 
that they denote 'intermediate cooperative farming' not only 
occurs in the Dominican Republic, but has developed in other 
places as well from the collective model. They suggest that this 
intermediate form, exactly because a certain trade-off has devel-
oped and a balance has been found between economie and social as-
pects, may prove to be more lasting than is thought by those who 
regard this transformation only as an effort of the farmers to 
come to complete individualization. 
The question is whether it is possible to come to the intermedi-
ate model from the bottom-up, voluntarily, on the initiative of 
the farmers. The farmers will not easily turn to complete collec-
tive production voluntarily. But it is conceivable that at a cer-
tain moment an intermediate form of cooperate production will be 
pursued, in which scale economies are realized, but the problems 
of joint production are avoided. This question is only inciden-
tically discussed, but the study suggests, that this bottom-up 
approach will encounter highly crucial problems. 
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NOTES 
(1) Rice provided in 1965 nearly 16% of the energy and nearly 14$ of 
the proteins in the average diet of the population. By 1980 
these percentages had reached 2"\% (energy) and 1Q% (protein). 
Rice was, by this Standard, the most important food item. 
(FAO, Foodbalance Sheets 1964-1966 and 1979-1981). 
(2) The percentage of votes for the Partido Reformista, Balaguer's 
party, decreased from 56,5 percent in 1966 to 52,8 percent in 
1970, while at the same time the turn-out at the elections 
strongly declined. The political support for Balaguer had de-
creased most at Azua, San Juan and San Cristobal, provinces that 
represent agricultural districts in the centre of the land, and 
in the northern provinces Espaillat, Salcedo, La Vega and Santi-
ago, that comprise important areas of agriculture as well. 
In 1974 Balaguer, as the coalition of opposition parties did not 
take part in the elections, won 84,7 percent of the votes. The 
pace of the land reform slows down at that point. 
(Julio G. Campillo Perez, 1978: 405-429). 
(3) It concerns a set of laws with respect to: 
- ceding a part of the area on which the state has constructed 
irrigation (Law No. 134 - 1971). 
- expropriation of insufficiënt exploited areas (Law No. 282 -
1972). 
- claiming land owned by the state, but in private use (Law No. 
292 - 1972). 
- expropriation of areas that are not exploited by the owner, 
but by tenant farmers (Law No 289 - 1972). 
- expropriation of rice areas where the state has constructed 
irrigation (Law No. 290 - 1972). 
- expropriation of large ownership (Law No. 31 4 - 1972). Areas 
of sugar enterprises are excepted. 
(Euripides R. Roques Roman, 1981: 137-190). 
(4) Law No 1 - 1966 that had validity till the end of the Balaguer 
administration that almost freezed the wages of employees and 
workers in the government and private sector. 
(5) In the 'Considerations' on Law No. 290 - 1972, it is indicated 
that the introduction of new rice varieties should make national 
self-reliance possible within a number of years. It is also 
indicated that at that moment the Instituto Agrario Dominicano, 
the land reform institute, controlled almost half (48 percent) 
of the national rice production. 
(6) Quezada et al. mention, that the rice producers had asked for an 
increase of the prices, which clearly was against the state 
policy on this point. 
(7) Josefina Arvelo, 1985, 179-182. 
(8) Don Kanel, Edward P. Reed and Michael R. Carter, Collective 
Farming: Lessons from Experience, LTC, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, July 1985 (Draft). 
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(9) Reed, 1977: 362-379. 
(10) The four farms in Esperanza border on each other and differ 
l i t t l e between them. The s o i l in Esperanza i s a b i t more perme-
able than in Rincon. The micro-elimate d i f fe rs s l i g h t l y from 
Rincon as well , the modern r i c e v a r i e t i e s JUMA 57 and 58 tha t 
are used in Rincon proved less su i t ab l e for the area of Esperan-
za. 
(11) IAD, Normas Provisionales para l a Organisación y e l Funciona-
miento de los Asentamientos Colectivos del IAD, 1974. 
(12) Manual de los Asentamientos Asooiativos, Santo Domingo, 1985. 
(13) Reed, 1977: 362. 
(14) Reed, 1977: 363-
(15) Mounier, 1981: 13-14, Crouch e t a l . , 1979: 66. 
(16) Reed, 1977: 365. 
(17) De Groot, 1983: 1-4. 
(18) Reed, 1977: 366. 
(19) Quezada, 1981 : 43-47-
(20) The co l l ec t ive farms in Esperanza were ra ted as A-1 c l i e n t s . 
According to Bravo the r a t i o of instalments on schedule o-f a l l 
land reform farmers was, over the period of 1976 to 1981 as f o l -
lows: 
individual farms co l lec t ive farms 
( a l l crops) (26%) ( a l l crops) (60%) 
( r ice in N. and N.W.) (69%) (81%) 
(21) Carter and Kanel, 1983: 45 
(22) Reed, 1977: 369-370 
(23) Reed, 1977: 370-371 
(24) Reed, 1977: 373-376 
(25) Reed, 1977: 376-378 
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